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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment-State Uni-
versity Regulation Prohibiting Use of Facilities for Student
Religious Worship or Teaching Violates Free Speech Rights.
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
Religious activities in public schools have been the sub-
ject of intense and controversial litigation for a number of
years. The constitutional issues involved in these disputes
arise from the first amendment of the United States Consti-
tution,' which assures personal freedom in the exercise of
religious belief 2 and speech 3 and also prohibits Congress and
the states4 from making any "law respecting an establish-
ment of religion."' 5 Interpretation of the relative effect of
these clauses on the constitutionality of student-initiated
religious worship in a state university was the subject of a
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
2. The portion of the first amendment which states that "Congress shall make no
law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]... " U.S. CONST. amend. I, is
referred to as the "free exercise clause."
3. The portion of the first amendment which states that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech.. ," U.S. CONST. amend. I, is referred to
as the "free speech clause."
4. Provisions of the first amendment have been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment and, therefore, apply to state governments as well as the federal govern-
ment. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating establishment
clause, which is that portion of the first amendment which states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion. . . " U.S. CONsT. amend. I);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating free exercise clause); Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating free speech clause).
5. One of the most often quoted definitions of the establishment clause was writ-
ten by Justice Black in 1947:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious orga-
nizations or groups and vice versa.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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recent United States Supreme Court decision. In Widmar v.
Vincent 6 the Court held that a university which makes facili-
ties generally available for meetings of registered student
groups cannot exclude a group because its meetings include
religious worship.
This note will analyze the Widmar decision in terms of
the Court's application of first amendment principles. In ad-
dition, it will analyze the potential impact of the decision on
student-initiated religious activities in public secondary
schools 7 as well as at state colleges and universities.
I. THE CASE
Widmar v. Vincent" involved a student group, Corner-
stone, which had regularly met in University of Missouri at
Kansas City facilities from 1973 to 1977 in accordance with
a university policy designed to promote the activities of reg-
istered student groups as a "cooperative aid to academic
study."9 In 1977 the university became aware that Corner-
stone's activities included aspects of "religious worship,"10
6. 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
7. The impact of the decision on public elementary schools is not considered be-
cause of various differences in elementary and secondary school policy and because it
is not likely that religious worship in elementary schools would be student-initiated.
8. 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). The case name in both the district court and court of
appeals was Chess v. Widmar. These prior decisions provide many of the facts. Chess
v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980),
aj'dsub non. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
9. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 1980), aj'dsub non Widmar
v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
10. The university made this determination based on a letter from Cornerstone's
attorney which contained the following description of the meetings:
Typical Cornerstone meetings in University facilities usually include the
following:
I. The offering of prayer,
2. The singing of hymns in praise and thanksgiving;
3. The public reading of scripture;
4. The sharing of personal views and experiences (in relation to God) by var-
ious persons;
5. An exposition of, and commentary on, passages of the Bible by one or
more persons for the purpose of teaching practical biblical principles; and
6. An invitation to the interested to meet for a personal discussion.
As you probably already know, these meetings are open to the public. Any
students, be they Jewish, Christian, Moslem, or any other persuasion are in-
vited, and, in fact, actively recruited by the students in Cornerstone.
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and informed the group it could no longer meet in university
buildings. The exclusion was based upon a university regu-
lation prohibiting the use of buildings or grounds "for pur-
poses of religious worship or religious teaching."" Adoption
of the exclusionary regulation was required, in the opinion
of the Board of Curators, 12 by the establishment clause of
the Missouri Constitution, 13 which requires a strict separa-
tion between the church and the state.
Members of Cornerstone brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri,
alleging that the regulation violated their rights of free exer-
cise of religion, equal protection and freedom of speech
under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.'4 In granting the university's motion for
summary judgment, the district court found that the exclu-
sionary regulation was required by the establishment clause
Although these meetings would not appear to a casual observer to corre-
spond precisely to a traditional worship service, there is no doubt that worship
is an important part of the general atmosphere. There also is no doubt that the
undecided and the uncommitted are encouraged and challenged to make a
personal decision in favor of trusting in Jesus Christ both for salvation and for
the power to live an abundant Christian life on earth.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1313-14 (8th Cir. 1980), a dsub non. Widmar v.
Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
11. The text of the regulation is as follows:
4.0314.0107 No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching
by either student or nonstudent groups. Student congregations of local
churches or of recognized denominations or sects, although not technically rec-
ognized campus groups, may use the facilities, commonly referred to as the
student union or center or commons under the same regulations that apply to
recognized campus organizations, provided that no University facilities may
be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching. The general
prohibition against use of University buildings and grounds for religious wor-
ship or religious teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of
Curators, by the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any
other construction. No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of
prayer or other appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in
University facilities. This provision does apply to such buildings as may be
designated under provision of part .0106.
Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1980), af'dsub nom. Widmar v.
Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981). The parties stipulated that there is no chapel on the
University of Missouri at Kansas City campus. Id at 1313 n.2.
12. Id at 1316.
13. Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 6; art. I, § 7; art. 9, § 8.
14. Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d
1310 (8th Cir. 1980), a.ffidsub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
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of the United States Constitution and rejected the argument
that it violated free exercise and free speech rights of the
students. 15
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.1 6
Its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which lim-
ited its holding to an analysis of the free speech and estab-
lishment clause concerns1 7 presented by the narrowly
defined factual situation.18
II. BACKGROUND
Much has been written about the intent of the framers of
the first amendment with respect to the "religion clauses"1 9
since application of their provisions to situations involving
the relationship between church and state is, at best, com-
plex.20 The free exercise clause can be stated as a means of
assuring personal freedom of religious belief or nonbelief.21
The establishment clause prohibits the government not only
from creating a state church, but also from taking any steps
toward the establishment of religion.22 Although separation
between church and state is required, some aspects of state
"accommodation" of religion are not only permissible but
necessary in order to allow free exercise of belief.23 There-
fore, both tension and harmony exist between the religion
clauses.
Supreme Court decisions with respect to religion and
public schools illustrate the Court's attempts to reconcile
both the supporting and conflicting elements of the religion
15. Id at 907.
16. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), af'dsub nom. Widmar
v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
17. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 276 n.13 (1981).
18. Id at 278.
19. See supra notes 2 & 4. The establishment and free exercise clauses are to-
gether referred to as the "religion clauses."
20. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 14 (1978); Gian-
nella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishraent and Doctrinal Development: Part L The
Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1381 (1967); Harrison, The Bible, The
Constitution and Public Education, 29 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1962).
21. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
22. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
23. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952).
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clauses. "Release time" 24 programs for religious instruction
are permissible25 except when they are conducted on school
property and under the supervision of the school administra-
tion. The state may constitutionally provide financial
assistance to parochial school children for bus transporta-
tion,27 and textbooks for the study of secular subjects, 28 but it
cannot subsidize the salaries of parochial school teachers
even for the teaching of secular subjects.29
Numerous decisions have dealt with religious activities
and worship on the elementary and secondary levels of pub-
lic education. Religious activities initiated by school author-
ities and teachers have uniformly been found to be in
violation of the establishment clause, even though they were
nondenominational and participation was not required.3
In Lemon v. Kurtzman31 the United States Supreme
Court established a tripartite test for determining whether a
state action violates the establishment clause. The Lemon
Court stated:
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional
prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three
main evils against which the establishment clause intended
to afford protection: "sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."
Every analysis in this area must begin with considera-
tion of the cumulative criteria developed by the court over
many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our
cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the stat-
24. Public school "release time" programs consist of releasing pupils at particular
times during regular school hours for the purpose of receiving religious instruction.
See generally Harrison, supra note 20, at 371-74.
25. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
26. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
27. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
28. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
29. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
30. See Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading);
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayers). See generally Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablshment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I1 The Nonestablishment
Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 561-80 (1968); Harrison, supra note 20, at 374-80.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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ute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement
with religion. 32
This test has been applied in a number of lower federal and
state court cases33 in which the courts were asked to deter-
mine whether religious activities in public secondary schools
violated the establishment clause even though they were vol-
untarily initiated by the students. These decisions have
unanimously held such activities to be a violation. In these
cases the courts also considered whether an establishment
clause prohibition on religious activity violated other first
amendment rights of the students. They concluded that
rights of free exercise of religion or free speech were not vio-
lated,34 or that students were not denied access to all "public
forums' 35 for religious expression,36 or that even if there was
32. Id at 612-13 (footnotes omitted). In a later case the Court clarified the appli-
cation of the test by specifying that if a statute fails to satisfy any one of the three
tests, it is violative of the establishment clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40
(1980).
33. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038 (5th Cir. 1982); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1981); Brandon v.
Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1982); Hunt
v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Johnson v. Huntington
Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 877 (1977); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978).
34. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1981); Bran-
don v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970
(1982); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263, 1266-67 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); John-
son v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, -, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 52-53, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65
A.D.2d 1, -, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 916-17 (1978).
35. "Public forums" are places, such as streets, sidewalks and parks, which have
achieved special status with respect to first amendment rights of citizenry.
Their classification as public forums serves as constitutional shorthand for the"
proposition that, in addition to its usual obligation of content-neutrality (an
obligation that exists whether or not a public forum is involved), government
cannot regulate speech-related conduct in such places except in narrow ways
shown to be necessary to serve significant governmental interests. Thus such
places cannot be put off limits to leafleting, parading, or other first amendment
activities merely to spare public expense or inconvenience; more focused regu-
lations of "time, place, or manner" are constitutionally compelled-even if the
regulation challenged as invalid leaves would-be speakers or paraders with
ample alternatives for communicating their views.
L. TRINE, supra note 20, at 689 (citations omitted).
36. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1982); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High
School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 1, -, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52-53, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877
(1977); Trietley v. Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, -, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 (1978).
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some infringement of constitutional rights, it was justified by
a compelling state interest in upholding the provisions of the
establishment clause.37
Religion clause cases involving the higher levels of edu-
cation have taken a somewhat different course from those
involving the lower educational levels. Professor Giannella
discusses this difference in terms of principles of academic
freedom and the purposes of secular instruction about reli-
gion. He also explores the view that a university should be
seen as a community in which the student temporarily re-
sides, thereby justifying greater accommodation of the stu-
dent's religious interests than is necessary at the lower
educational levels where the student lives at home.38 Al-
though Widmar is the first case to reach the United States
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the establishment
clause is violated by student-initiated religious worship, a
state court previously held that such activities do not violate
the establishment clause and that their prohibition is an in-
fringement on other first amendment rights of the students.
In Keegan v. University of Delaware39 the Delaware Superior
Court decided a prohibition on the use of dormitory com-
mon areas for student religious purposes was a violation of
the free exercise rights of the students.40
The Supreme Court's decision in Widmar confirms that
state universities cannot exclude student-initiated religious
worship where the university has made facilities generally
available to student groups. Therefore, a dichotomy has de-
veloped which treats similar student-initiated religious activ-
ities and worship in the public schools differently, depending
upon whether the place involved is a state university or a
public secondary school.
37. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1982); Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263,
1266 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68
Cal. App. 3d 1, -, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 52-53, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
38. See Giannella, supra note 30, at 381-83.
39. 349 A.2d 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975).




In writing for the majority,4 Justice Powell found that
through its policy of providing meeting facilities the univer-
sity had created a forum generally open to registered student
groups and therefore had "assumed an obligation to justify
its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitu-
tional norms. 42 He stated that "with respect to persons enti-
tled to be there, . . . the First Amendment rights of speech
and association extend to the campuses of state universi-
ties. ' 43 The majority also determined that "religious wor-
ship and discussion" are forms of free speech protected by
the first amendment,44 and, therefore, in order to justify its
regulation prohibiting religious worship and teaching, the
university must show that it is "necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end. 45
The university argued that allowing religious worship in
its facilities was a violation of the establishment clause of the
United States Constitution and that the state had a compel-
ling interest in complying with its constitutional obligations.
The majority agreed that if an open forum policy which did
41. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist
and O'Connor joined Justice Powell in the majority opinion.
42. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 273 (1981).
43. Id at 273. See Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
44. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 274 (1981). It was the majority's determi-
nation that "religious worship and discussion" are forms of speech protected by the
first amendment which sparked a portion of Justice White's dissent. He argued for a
distinction between religious worship and other forms of religious speech. Id at 282
(White, J., dissenting). In his opinion, unless the distinction is drawn, "the Religion
Clauses would be emptied of independent meaning in circumstances in which reli-
gious practice took the form of speech." Id The majority's response was that such a
distinction lacks intelligible content, is beyond judicial competence to administer, and
lacks relevance to the preservation of the establishment clause. Id at 274 n.6.
In most cases involving religion clause concerns, establishment clause prohibitions
are balanced against the possibility of free exercise restraints. It is unclear whether
the Court's analysis of Widmar in terms of free speech is due to a fact situation (exclu-
sion from an open forum) found in free speech conflicts, or whether it signals a shift
in policy with respect to establishment clause cases. If the decision does represent
such a shift, it is then unclear whether application of free speech considerations to
situations formerly determined on the basis of free exercise considerations will have a
significant impact.
45. Id at 274. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
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not exclude religious worship and teaching was, in fact, in
violation of the establishment clause, then the exclusionary
regulation would be justified on the basis of a "compelling
state interest." 46  However, the majority did not find that
such a nonexclusionary open forum policy would be viola-
tive of the establishment clause.
The Court analyzed the establishment clause issue ac-
cording to the tripartite test specified in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man.47 The Court agreed with the conclusion of both the
district court and the court of appeals that a nonexclusionary
open forum policy would have a secular purpose and would
avoid excessive entanglement with religion.48  The Court
also found that such a policy would not have the primary
effect of advancing religion because any benefits to religion
would be merely "incidental benefits"' 49 which do not "vio-
late the prohibition against the 'primary advancement' of
religion. ' 50  Two factors were found particularly relevant.
First, use of an open forum would not confer any imprima-
tur of state approval on religion.51 Second, the provision
of benefits to a broad spectrum of groups indicates the secu-
46. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 276 (1981).
47. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
48. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 275 (1981). See Chess v. Widmar, 480 F.
Supp. 907, 914 (W.D. Mo. 1979), rev'd, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980), aj'dsub nomL
Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981), where the court said:
A university policy that permitted any student group to meet in university-
owned buildings for any purpose would aid all student groups, regardless of
religious affiliation and would, therefore, reflect a clear secular purpose. In
addition, since such a policy would make no distinction between groups or
their purposes, entanglement with religion would be completely avoided.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed with this reasoning. Chess v.
Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980), aff'dsub nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 102
S. Ct. 269 (1981).
49. In considering whether a governmental policy or regulation has a "primary
effect" of advancing religion, the Court has held there is no violation of the establish-
ment clause if there is "only a remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious
institutions." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450 (1961). See also Committee
for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973).
50. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 276 (1981).
51. Id The court of appeals stated that such a policy "would no more commit the
University to. . . religious goals" than it is 'now committed to the goals of the Stu-
dents for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance" or any other group
eligible to use its facilities. Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980),
qjldsub nora. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
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lar effect of the policy. 2 Therefore, a policy which does not
exclude religious worship and teaching meets all three of the
establishment clause tests and is constitutionally permissible.
The university also claimed that it had a compelling in-
terest in complying with the applicable provisions of the
Missouri Constitution,5 3 which has been found by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court to require a stricter separation of
church and state than the Federal Constitution.5 4 The ma-
jority, however, rejected this argument on the basis that the
state's interest in a greater separation between church and
state than that ensured by the establishment clause of the
United States Constitution was not sufficiently compelling to
justify infringement of the student group's right to free
speech. 5
The majority pointed out that its holding did not pre-
clude the university from establishing reasonable time, place
and manner regulations5 6 and recognized the right to "ex-
clude even First Amendment activities that violate reason-
able campus rules or substantially interfere with the
opportunity of other students to obtain an education." 57 The
narrowness of the basis of the Court's decision was also care-
fully specified:
Having created a forum generally open to student groups,
the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion
of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the
fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech
should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to
52. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 277 (1981). The Court noted that there
are over 100 nonreligious and religious registered student groups to whom the use of
university facilities is available (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41
(1977); Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
756, 781-82 n.38 (1973)).
53. See supra note 13.
54. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 277 (1981) (citing, e.g., American United
v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 720 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029
(1976) (holding that the Missouri Constitution requires stricter separation of church
and state than does the United States Constitution)).
55. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 277 (1981).
56. Id at 278 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Baake, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13
(1978); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring in the judgment)).
57. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 278 (1981).
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justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.5 8
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens expressed his
fear that academic freedom might be undermined if a "com-
pelling state interest" was necessary to exclude use of any
"public forum" that a university created.5 9 His concern was
not that academic freedom with regard to the curriculum
would be limited, but that it would be difficult to make deci-
sions concerning time and space available to extracurricular
activities unless content of proposed student activities was a
permissible consideration.60 However, he did agree that the
university could not deny access unless it had a valid reason
and that the establishment clause concerns with respect to
both the United States and Missouri Constitutions were not
valid.6'
A major portion62 of Justice White's dissent is based on
his belief that the states are "a good deal freer to formulate
policies that affect religion in divergent ways" than is re-
flected in the holding.63 It is his contention that the estab-
lishment clause allows state policies which incidentally
burden religion just as it allows policies which incidentally
benefit religion.64 He defines the issue as "not whether the
state must, or must not, open its facilities to religious wor-
58. Id
59. Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Id at 279. Justice Stevens suggests that if, for example, two groups of stu-
dents made conflicting requests for the use of facilities, "one to view Mickey Mouse
cartoons and the other to rehearse an amateur performance of Hamlet," the university
should not have to defend its decision on the basis of a "compelling state interest."
Id However, it appears that the majority dealt with this concern by not questioning
the right of the university to make academic judgments as to the allocation of scarce
resources. Id at 278.
Laurence Tribe employs the term "semi-public forum" when referring to places
such as schools and libraries where the government has powers denied in a true public
forum to "preserve such tranquility as the facility's central purpose requires." L.
TRIBE, supra note 20, at 690. It would seem reasonable that if "semi-public forums"
are required to allocate scarce resources, they could also develop constitutionally per-
missible regulations denying access to groups whose messages are incompatible with
the central purpose of the forum.
61. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 279-80 (1981).
62. Justice White also disagreed with the majority's opinion that religious wor-
ship is protected speech under the first amendment. See supra note 44 and accompa-
nying text.
63. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 281 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). See
also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422-23 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 281 (1981).
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ship; rather, it is whether the state may choose not to do
so.'65 He concludes that the minimal burden on the group
to meet off campus is justified by the state's interest in
"avoiding claims that it is financing or otherwise supporting
religious worship." 66
IV. ANALYSIS
Widmar v. Vincent clearly specifies that when a state uni-
versity adopts a policy making meeting facilities generally
available to recognized student groups, it cannot exclude
from that accommodation religious student groups.67 If the
decision is narrowly interpreted to apply only when a stu-
dent-group forum is created by a policy of access to facilities
and only when a state university is involved, then this deci-
sion will have limited impact on future cases. If, however,
this decision is broadly interpreted to apply to public secon-
dary schools where students wish to use the facilities to con-
duct religious activities and worship, then this decision will
have widespread effect simply because of the greater number
of secondary schools.
To date, there has not been a United States Supreme
Court decision dealing with the constitutionality of exclud-
ing religious activities of student groups in public secondary
schools. However, lower court decisions, both before and
after Widmar, have held that use of school facilities by reli-
gious student groups violates the establishment clause even
when the facilities have been made generally available to
other student groups.6
Several of these decisions are based on a finding that
public secondary schools are not public forums which give
65. Id at 284. Justice white cites cases which have allowed state policies which
benefit religion, but which do not require states to provide such benefits. See Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state loan of textbooks to parochial school
students); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release of students from public
schools for religious instruction off school premises); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (state financed transportation for parochial school students).
66. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 284 (1981).
67. Id. at 278.
68. See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1041 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1982); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High
School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
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rise to free speech rights of the students.69 However, the
Supreme Court held in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
School District,70 a case which involved a public secondary
school, that first amendment rights extend to students and
teachers during school hours. Although Tinker did not spe-
cifically consider the issue of whether public secondary
schools constituted a public forum,71 several writers have
construed this decision to suggest such a result,72 and several
district courts have treated public secondary schools as pub-
lic forums with regard to religious activities.73 In addition,
the Widmar Court distinguished Brandon v. Board of Educa-
tion74 and Hunt v. Board of Education75 on the grounds that,
in those cases, religious groups were denied access to facili-
ties not available to other groups.76 It may be that in the
future the Court will agree that public secondary schools can
create the type of forum which will require a showing of
compelling state interest to justify any content-based
exclusions.
69. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1048 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 980 (1982); Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High
School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 45-46, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877
(1977).
70. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
71. The issue in Tinker involved the constitutionality of the school's prohibiting
students from wearing black arm bands in protest of the Vietnam war. Therefore, the
public forum issue did not arise as in Widmar, where the university purposely created
a forum for all student activities with the exception of religious worship and teaching.
72. See generally Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969
DuaKn L.i. 93 1; Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public
Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 278 (1970); Comment, The Public School as a
Public Forum, 54 TEx. L. REv. 90 (1975).
73. Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp. 1319
(E.D. Wis. 1976); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592 (D. N.H. 1973).
74. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 970 (1982). Although the
Court in Widmar distinguished Brandon on the ground that the student group was
denied the use of facilities not available to other student groups, Widmar, 102 S. Ct. at
276, the court of appeals in Brandon stated "that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment [does] not require a religious organization to be treated in a
manner similar to the secular student groups permitted to use the school facilities."
Brandon, 635 F.2d at 974. This statement appears to indicate that Brandon is not
distinguishable from Widmar on the public forum issue.
75. 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (where secondary schools did not have
open forum policy for student group meetings).
76. Widmar, 102 S. Ct. at 276 n.13.
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Assuming that public secondary and elementary schools
are then capable of creating public forums by making facili-
ties generally available to student groups, the issue of
whether use of those forums by student religious groups
would be violative of the establishment clause must be ad-
dressed. Returning to the Court's tripartite test for the anal-
ysis of establishment clause cases, it is reasonable to assume
that if public secondary schools proposed policies which pro-
vided for nondiscriminatory access to school facilities for all
student groups, the courts would find that such policies had
a "secular purpose. 77 However, the issues involved in de-
termining whether such policies would create an excessive
entanglement with religion and have the primary effect of
advancing religion may prove to be more difficult to resolve.
In Brandon7 and Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lub-
bock Independent School District79 the courts found that use
of public secondary school facilities by student religious
groups fostered "excessive entanglement" because of state
laws which require supervision of students on school prem-
ises. Whether the degree of supervision required by state
law of student groups in secondary schools is significantly
greater than the "supervision" which a state university must
provide in order to assure that student activities proceed in
an orderly manner has not been determined. Widmar did
not consider whether such "supervisory" activities as the
provision of campus security, assignment of meeting places
and clerical activities respecting student groups constituted a
state "entanglement" with religion.
In Widmar the Court concluded that a policy granting
access to religious groups did not have the "primary effect of
advancing religion," in part, because students would not in-
fer that the university supported religion from the mere fact
that meetings were allowed in campus facilities.8 0 The Court
77. The Widmar Court found secular purpose for such a policy. Widmar, 102 S.
Ct. at 275. Secular purpose for a similar policy was also found in Brandon, 635 F.2d
at 978. But see Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669
F.2d 1038, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1982), where a school district's policy allowing student
groups to use facilities for religious meetings did not sufficiently serve secular
interests.
78. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 979.
79. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1047.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 276.
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did distinguish between university students and younger stu-
dents in this respect when it stated that "[u]niversity students
are, of course, young adults. They are less impressionable
than younger students and should be able to appreciate that
the university's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."'8
In addition, lower court cases dealing with student-initiated
religious activities have voiced strong establishment clause
concerns on this very issue. 2
V. CONCLUSION
It is possible that the Widmar decision signals a willing-
ness of the present Court to reconsider the broad issue of
religious activities in all public schools. Widmar goes so far
as to say that a state university is constitutionally required to
provide access to its facilities for any type of student reli-
gious speech, when there is general student access to that
same forum. 3 Counsel for the respondents suggested that
this line of reasoning could lead to the conclusion that non-
student religious groups would have to be allowed access to
public university forums, if other nonstudents have similar
access.84 It also appears that Widmar provides a strong basis
for attacking lower court decisions which have prohibited
student-initiated religious activities in public secondary
schools. Ultimately, this trend could lead to an erosion of
the establishment clause.
LINDA R. OLSON
8 1. Id at 276 n.14.
82. See, eg., Lubbock CivilLiberties Union, 669 F.2d at 1043; Brandon, 635 F.2d
at 978. See also Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 750, 754 (1976); L.
TRIBE, supra note 20, at 825, and cases cited therein.
83. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 278 (1981).
84. Id at 282-83 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
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